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ABSTRACT
Objectives This study adopted a process view of 
organisational learning to investigate the barriers to 
effective organisational learning from medical errors.
Methods Qualitative data were collected from 40 
clinicians in high and low performing hospitals. The fit 
between the organisational learning process and socio- 
technical factors was investigated systematically from a 
pre- reporting stage to reporting and post- reporting stages.
Results The analysis uncovered that the major stumbling 
blocks to active learning lie largely in the post- reporting 
stages and that they are rooted in social rather than 
technical issues. Although the experience of the higher- 
performing hospital provides valuable pointers in terms of 
creating more trusting environment and using the potential 
of small failures towards ways in which the organisational 
learning process in the lower hospital might be improved, 
due to lack of local mangers’ proactive engagement in 
integrating changes into practice the active learning takes 
place in neither of the hospitals.
Conclusions To ensure that the change solutions are 
firmly incorporated into the culture and routine practice 
of the hospital, we need to focus on fostering an 
organisational culture that encourages positive cooperation 
and mutual interactions between local managers and 
frontline clinicians. This process will lead to double- loop 
learning and an increase in system safety.
INTRODUCTION
Medical errors have long been a significant 
challenge and cause of mortality and morbidity 
in the healthcare industry. Evidence indicates 
that an estimated 42.7 million medical errors 
occur in hospitals every year, of which nearly 
50%–83% could have been prevented.1 
Severe harm, disability and death are the 
result of preventable medical errors1 with the 
associated cost of US$42 billion annually.2
Given the importance of healthcare in 
patients’ lives, not surprising, several studies 
have been conducted to understand the ways 
to develop a safer healthcare system.3–10 One 
of the more prevalent discussions within the 
literature on patient safety is around organi-
sational learning and, crucially, the need for 
sharing experiential knowledge of medical 
errors. Learning from failures is a process 
that can strongly improve organisational 
performance by developing new knowledge 
through finding errors and understanding 
their cause and effect.11–13 The suggestion 
here is that by exploiting knowledge of prior 
failure experience, correcting problems and 
replacing existing procedures,14 healthcare 
organisations can better avoid the prevent-
able medical errors, thus reducing rates of 
future failure and decreasing failure- related 
costs,12 15 hence, minimising harm to patients.
It is evident that healthcare organisations 
are built on error management processes,9 
and that much of the organisational learning 
is concerned with the sharing of medical 
errors.16 Sharing of medical errors, however, 
can flourish by developing an open, partici-
pative and blame- free culture, known as just 
culture.17 For example, Vincent et al18 argue 
that clinicians are generally unwilling to be 
transparent about their medical errors due 
to fear of adverse consequences such as litiga-
tion and loss of job. They are not alone in this 
suggestion. Several scholars have suggested 
that medical professionals assume that 
sharing medical errors might constrain their 
Strengths and limitations of this study
 ► Forty interviews helped to provide a full and rich de-
scription of the socio- technical nature of the organi-
sational learning process and systematically identify 
the barriers to effective organisational learning in 
each stage.
 ► Investigating the organisational learning process in 
high and low performing hospitals provided a com-
pelling case for comparison to add to this area of 
research.
 ► Much of the insights on the strengths and weak-
nesses of organisational learning are gained from 
frontline clinicians.
 ► It would have been useful to know more about the 
viewpoints of the local managers.
 ► Overall, many of the studies on patient safety fo-
cused on developed countries and insights from the 
low- income and middle- income is lacking.
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career development.19–21 Just culture improves the level 
of trust and the quality of communication throughout 
the organisation as it encourages learning from failures 
rather than leading clinicians into getting into trouble or 
being criticised.9 22
Subsequent literature, however, goes on to suggest that 
the healthcare industry is very complex and, therefore, 
successful learning from failures cannot only take place as 
a result of creating a just culture. For instance, the change 
of the culture requires all actors who have been involved 
in the learning process to share a common vision and 
this cannot occur without support from management.8 
Since the healthcare industry is strongly hierarchical, 
the role of management is highly influential in staffing 
behaviours.23–25 Therefore, leaders need to facilitate the 
learning process by creating an environment where just 
culture is valued and considered as central to patient 
safety.
In addition to the cultural issues, information systems 
(IS) are a requirement for developing a practical 
approach to organisational learning from failures.8 26 
IS are expected to enhance organisational learning by 
connecting individuals to share knowledge through 
shared storage27 and thus making the required infor-
mation and knowledge available to authorised users 
more efficiently.27 28 Given that effective communication 
and knowledge management are central in organisa-
tional learning,29 the learning process would be severely 
constrained in the absence of effective IS. Such systems 
provide professionals with an opportunity for sharing 
medical errors or safety concerns30 and enable managers 
to have access to the pool of information for extracting 
lessons,17 31 thereby potentially improving health 
outcomes for patients.
The information that can be gleaned from these studies 
suggests that organisational learning from failures is 
a socio- technical approach. In other words, successful 
learning from failures depends on several elements, from 
soft issues such as cultural factors to hard issues such 
as technologies. It could be said that the interactions 
among these elements determine the learning results. 
Following this realisation, healthcare organisations such 
as the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK intro-
duced a new service- wide system of knowledge manage-
ment, which is the National Reporting and Learning 
System,32 as well as purposed- designed incident reporting 
IS to encourage organisational learning from failures.17 
However, despite this, substantial changes have not yet 
been achieved in reducing the burden of patient harm 
due to preventable medical errors.2 3 For example, 750 
deaths a month are avoidable in the NHS of England.33 
There is a case also for the USA where the number of 
preventable medical errors has risen to more than 250 
000 people which makes medical errors the third largest 
cause of death in this country after cancer and obesity 
and more than guns and cars.34
These indicate that there are still barriers to effective 
organisational learning that they have not yet been fully 
understood. It is, therefore, time for a fundamental 
rethinking of the way that organisational learning 
from medical errors is investigated. Learning from 
medical errors has been treated as a black box by most 
researchers. This means that organisational learning 
from past failure experiences is seen as a single process, 
that is seen to constitute and act as a single entity; hence 
the details of preventing, analysing and learning are 
concealed. In this study, however, it is stressed that this 
cannot provide a complete and clear explanation of 
the barriers to effective organisational learning from 
failures. Therefore, this study proposes that to better 
understand the barriers to effective learning a process 
view of organisational learning, we need to emphasise 
the sequence of events that provides insights on the 
nature of the inner workings of the learning process 
from the pre- reporting stage to reporting, and post- 
reporting stages. Dividing the learning process into 
different stages makes it possible to investigate each 
stage separately and therefore better understand where 
the learning process fails and, hence, can lead it in the 
best possible direction.
The process view of organisational learning has recently 
received attention and has been applied to understand the 
barriers to effective organisational learning in different 
industries.35–37 However, it is noticeably ignored in health-
care,38 although exceptions exist.7 Nevertheless, Currie et 
al7 did not go beyond the identification and reporting of 
the incidents, and the details, especially on preventing 
the reoccurrence of the medical errors, are ignored.
The process view of organisational learning is devel-
oped based on the information processing perspective: 
acquiring, interpreting, distributing and storing infor-
mation within organisations.29 Based on this foundation 
and following the Department of Health17 [‘Department 
of Health sets the overall strategy, funds and oversees 
the health and care system in England’ ],39 the process 
of organisational learning from failure in this study is 
divided into the following four stages:
1. Initial incident identification.
2. Reporting incidents.
3. Deducing appropriate lessons from failures.
4. Incorporating changes into practice.
The first stage explains all the events that lead to the 
decision as to whether or not to share medical errors 
to alter organisational knowledge. In the second stage, 
clinicians document the actual incident report through 
IS. In the third stage, meaningful new knowledge should 
be then extracted from incidents reports. In the final 
stage, change solutions should be firmly incorporated 
into the culture and routine practice of the hospital and 
organisational behaviour should be altered as a result of 
changes made to organisational knowledge.40 If all these 
stages were complete successfully, active learning will take 
place.35 This is the only way that healthcare organisations 
can be benefited from sharing failures.17 41 This high-
lights the paramount importance of the achievement of 
sustained improvements in each of these stages since a 
 on A









pen: first published as 10.1136/bm





3Monazam Tabrizi N, Masri F. BMJ Open 2021;11:e048036. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2020-048036
Open access
flaw or defect in one stage can prevent active learning 
from taking place.
So far, it is clear that successful learning from failures 
is a series of stages and must consider various elements 
to ensure a positive outcome. It is proposed that the 
learning process is influenced by the impact of socio- 
technical factors (eg, organisational culture and tech-
nology support). As a result, the successful learning 
process cannot occur without the support of socio- 
technical factors. Similarly, the impact of socio- technical 
factors on successful learning from failures cannot be 
investigated in detail without considering the different 
stages of the learning process. Accordingly, the fit 
between the learning process and socio- technical factors 
must be emphasised to investigate the challenges to active 
learning from failures.
Hence, this research investigates the process of organ-
isational learning from medical errors with the aim to 
provide a rich description of its socio- technical nature. 
Such a description enables us to unpick factors and condi-
tions necessary to promote and sustain each stage of the 
learning process, which in turn can reveal how and why 
effective and active learning can take place. The main 
focus of this research falls within the context of NHS of 
England, where, as discussed earlier, there are still chal-
lenges in providing safe and high- quality care.
The section on methods explains how the two NHS 
hospitals and the 40 clinicians interviewed were selected. 
It also explains the strategies for data collection and anal-
ysis. This is followed by an in- depth, socio- technical anal-
ysis of the organisational learning process in the NHS. 
The discussion highlights the findings and calls attention 
to the need for a focus on enhancing post- reporting stages 
and fostering an organisational culture that encourages 
positive cooperation and mutual interactions between 
local managers and frontline clinicians.
METHODS
To be able to gain insight into the focus of this research, a 
full and rich description of the phenomenon was needed. 
In doing so, the process of learning from medical errors is 
compared in two NHS hospitals in England with different 
performance levels so that to be able to (1) understand if 
the learning process differs in high and low performing 
hospitals, (2) identify the dimensions where one is better 
than the other and (3) understand the main reasons 
for the differences as well as similarities between the 
learning processes. The two case studies were similar in 
terms of staffing level and the incident reporting system. 
However, they were strategically chosen to provide 
comparative insights, with one being among the top 10 
high performing NHS hospitals in England, while the 
other was categorised among the 20 lowest performing 
NHS hospitals. This helps to provide not only richness in 
variety but also yields opportunities for literal replication 
across the two cases.42 For confidentiality, and to protect 
the identity of the chosen NHS hospitals, the hospitals 
are identified by codes rather than names. For example, 
in the first case study, the hospital which is considered 
as high performing is coded as hospital A and in the 
second case study, the hospital which is considered as low 
performing is coded as hospital B.
Data were collected over a 9- month period. Semi- 
structured interviews were carried out for data collec-
tion. The sampling focus was based on actors involved in 
the process of learning from medical errors that deeply 
understand the situation. We were, in particular, looking 
for those clinicians who work closely in a team so that 
to comprehensively explore the interactions among the 
learning process actors. Therefore, when considering 
these reasons, we decided to interview clinicians who 
worked in the same ward. Considering the busy envi-
ronment of the healthcare industry, two similar wards in 
each case study were targeted. In total, 40 (10 in each 
ward and therefore 20 in each case study) interviews 
were undertaken across two hospitals, with an average 
of 60 min each. Interviews were conducted in the work-
place and the sample was selected based on the interest 
and availability of the healthcare providers. With permis-
sion received from the ward managers, clinicians were 
approached face- to- face by the field researcher for 
recruitment in each ward. Care was taken to select partic-
ipants representing different positions and roles in each 
ward. The set of interviewees included doctors, nurses, 
physiologists and dieticians. An overview of participants 
by occupation, gender and work experience is presented 
in table 1. Potential identifiers were removed to preserve 
participants’ anonymity. The key themes discussed during 
interviews aimed at understanding the factors that drive 
each stage of the learning process or cause the deep- 
rooted barriers in each stage from the frontline clini-
cians’ perspective.
In the process of interview data collection, we followed 
the principles suggested by Saunders et al43 to guar-
antee the reliability and validity of our research. Face- 
to- face interactions and prolonged involvement in the 
field were seen as a powerful means to build trust and 
Table 1 An overview of participants
Hospital A Hospital B Total
Occupation:
  Nurse 8 8 16
  Doctor 7 8 15
  Dietician 2 2 4
  Physiologist 3 2 5
Gender:
  Female 9 13 22
  Male 11 7 18
Years in the hospital:
  More than 10 years 6 5 11
  Between 5 and 10 years 9 8 17
  Between 1 and 5 years 5 7 12
 on A









pen: first published as 10.1136/bm





4 Monazam Tabrizi N, Masri F. BMJ Open 2021;11:e048036. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2020-048036
Open access 
rapport between the field researcher and clinicians. This 
helped to collect sufficient data and recruit new partici-
pants into the study during data analysis until a saturation 
point was reached when no new information emerged 
from the data. Semi- structured interviews leave room for 
unpredictable questions but maintain consistency within 
the structure.44 The field researcher followed the inter-
view guide (see the online supplemental file 1), which 
was developed following Saunders et al’s43 guideline, to 
ensure all participants in the selected hospitals get the 
same experience and thus diminishing sources of bias. It is 
recognised that interviewees could have been reluctant to 
discuss their mistakes for the fear of managers’ criticisms. 
Interviewees were given a participant information sheet, 
providing key information about the study including data 
confidentiality and anonymity. During the interviews, 
words were carefully chosen, and an indirect questioning 
technique was used to minimise socially desirable bias.45 
Since the researcher was likely to use the new knowledge 
ineffectively at first (eg, false interpretation), she applied 
the mirroring question and answer technique.46 If neces-
sary, the researcher took the words or phrases used by 
clinicians and repeated them in a subsequent question 
in order to minimise false interpretation. The findings of 
the study were also checked with three clinicians in each 
hospital.
All the interviews conducted for this study were tape- 
recorded and then transcribed for in- depth analysis. To 
analyse the interview data, deductive thematic analysis was 
employed, which required the researcher to produce a 
list of codes that represented the themes identified in the 
textual data.47 The field researcher undertook the initial 
coding and produced a list of codes that represent the 
learning process, that is, initial incident identification, 
reporting incidents, deducing appropriate lessons from 
failures and incorporating changes into practice. These 
themes were used to identify the factors that have an 
impact on the learning process. All elements of data were 
added and categorised by the relevant themes in a spread-
sheet. The second researcher then coded samples of data 
to test the consistency of codes. Coded interviews were 
discussed by the researchers and differences of interpre-
tation were discussed until consensus was reached. Finally, 
the coded data were regularly compared and contrasted 
to interpret the views of individual respondents.
Patient and public involvement
Patients and/or public were not involved in the study.
The process of organisational learning from past failure 
experiences in the NHS
Initial incident identification
When an incident happens, clinicians who are involved in 
the incident need to decide whether or not to report it. In 
doing this, actors have to be adequately motivated; other-
wise, they will not be willing to contribute.40 From our 
fieldwork, it was evident that clinicians in both hospitals 
were willing to report the incident and start the learning 
process. An overwhelming majority of clinicians in both 
hospitals believed that learning lessons from mistakes 
could develop better practices in the future and conse-
quently improve patient safety. As a result, patient safety 
promotes a favourable attitude towards reporting medical 
errors and, thus, is motivating.
Clinicians here are eager to provide high- quality ser-
vices to patients and look after them in the best pos-
sible way. So, it’s more safety of the patients, and if I 
bring something everybody gets to know it and next 
time try to prevent it (Doctor 11, Hospital A).
I would think about patient care all the time. That’s 
why I did nursing and patient care. So, it’s always the 
patient. It could be awkward after [incident report-
ing], I feel bad, but that’s this job (Nurse 22, Hospital 
B).
However, despite these, fundamental differences in the 
culture of the two NHS hospitals involved in this study 
were found. As already highlighted, the key to learning 
from incidents is to create an organisational climate 
in which clinicians psychologically feel comfortable to 
report their errors.48 In the case of hospital A, almost all 
clinicians confirmed that the hospital exposes clinicians 
to an appropriate culture of blame- free assessment and 
learning which does not lead clinicians into getting into 
trouble or being criticised.
I don’t take it [incident] as something to penalise 
one. It’s all about tracking up something where ev-
eryone can learn. We do a lot of these [incident re-
porting], and it’s all about preventing the same thing 
happen again (Dietician 3, Hospital A).
Conversely, evidence indicates that the culture of 
hospital B errs towards a blame culture. However, the 
interesting point here is that while the existing organisa-
tional culture within the hospital can sometimes consti-
tute a barrier to reporting the incidents, most of the time 
it affects the quality of the incidents reports. Interviewees 
repeatedly expressed that since they work in a team, 
when an incident happens, especially a severe incident, 
everyone will know about that. Therefore, they do not 
have a choice not to report it. In effect, clinicians in this 
hospital might report the incident, however, because of 
the lack of trust in the culture, they sometimes act against 
the identification of the true causes of the failure for fear 
of punishment and appearing as incompetent. This is an 
important issue as the accuracy of the incident report 
is very important in identifying the real causes of the 
incident and incorporating the necessary changes into 
practice.
In theory, it shouldn’t be a blaming culture, but in 
real life, it feels like that isn’t the case. So, I think 
the cultural thing isn’t quite right and [they’re] try-
ing to improve that but there is a long way to go. But 
there seems to be this trend, or it’s a cultural thing 
that we need to find out something that went wrong 
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and then it can be addressed. And sometimes you just 
have a scenario which is just bad luck, everything was 
done to good practice and it was just bad luck and 
there was nothing that could have been done to avoid 
it. But people investigate these things that we have 
to come up with some recommendations and that’s 
quite off- putting (Consultant 21, Hospital B).
If I understand correctly how it works, an incident 
report is basically that you don’t get blamed for it, you 
don’t get into trouble over it. They offer you training 
if you need training and then you try to learn some-
thing for your organisation. Whereas often I find in 
the NHS, you get blamed; find some blaming news, 
you know, is to blame who is responsible and that’s 
the opposite of helpful (Nurse 25, Hospital B).
The findings of the case study revealed that mutual 
trust between ward managers and clinicians could alle-
viate the negative impact of the blaming culture in this 
hospital and increases the likelihood of successful inci-
dent reporting. In other words, when ward managers are 
perceived as trustworthy, then incident reporting and 
accuracy of the reports are more likely. This is because 
clinicians are certain about the intention of their senior 
management and do not fear job security.
If you make a mistake like a drug error then you 
might not want to fill in the form—“oh it can cause 
a matter to me”. But you might want to check with 
the ward manager and see what they suggest. Here 
our ward manager … is really supportive. You know, 
the managers should be quite supportive then people 
can trust and be honest about what happened (Nurse 
30, Hospital B).
Reporting incidents
At this stage, clinicians prepare the actual incident report 
by documenting who was involved in the incident and 
what the situation was. As documented elsewhere,7 the 
incidents reports are first received by local managers and 
then by the National Patient Safety Agency. IS is a partic-
ularly important part. This study found that a unified 
mechanism and purpose- designed systems of incident 
information gathering are in place in both hospitals. As 
a result, incidents can be easily documented and hence 
the lessons can be identified accordingly. The findings of 
the case study revealed that incident reporting at both 
hospitals is all based on information communication 
technologies (ICTs). Since technology is involved, tech-
nical support is also required so that to protect the use of 
ICTs for the purpose of incidents reporting. Clinicians in 
both hospitals confirmed that the online system matches 
their requirements and that they have the required skills 
and knowledge to use the system. One of the physiologists 
in hospital B commented on the value of this electronic 
system as follows:
There used to be a huge booklet everyone saw as a 
drag of timing. But now it’s straightforward, you go 
along and fill out the boxes. … the good thing about 
that [online forms] is, if you don’t fill in a section, it 
tells you “you cannot move on”. So, they [manage-
ment team] like that because all the information is 
given whereas, if it is on paper, it’s easy to skip the 
sections.
In light of the above statement and similar comments 
from other interviewees, NHS hospitals recently switched 
from a paper- based system to an electronic system for 
reporting incidents. Most of the clinicians confirmed 
that the new electronic system is more effective in several 
ways. First, it helps in transferring a complete report that 
is required by the management team. Second, managers 
can access the report instantly and extract valuable 
lessons. Third, departments with more and recurring 
incidents can be detected. Fourth, the system provides 
the opportunity for confidential reporting.
However, this system is not without a problem. When 
clinicians fill out the online form and send it, there is no 
chance of modifying the form if necessary. Whereas, with 
the old paper- based system, clinicians could add more 
information if they could remember something new. It is 
also common sense that clinicians need to have access to 
computers so that to report the incident. There are few 
numbers of personal computers available on each ward, 
which are shared by clinicians, and like the findings of 
Sujan,49 this seemed to retard the incident reporting.
So, certain hours through the day you’ve got just 
a massive volume of staff, all want a computer. 
Sometimes you might need a computer and stand 
free, and you do what you want because everyone is 
doing treatment sessions. But at certain hours of the 
day, it isn’t easy to get computers (Nurse 8, Hospital 
A).
Deducing appropriate lessons from incidents reports
Once incidents have been reported, they must be prop-
erly analysed by the management team. They use the 
reports to deduce lessons and decide on actions which 
need to be taken. These actions depend on the nature 
of the incident, which would show how serious it is. For 
example, if there was a severe incident that happened 
because of the clinicians’ lack of knowledge and skill, the 
management team would send the clinicians to relevant 
training. All evidence suggested that the management 
team in hospital A actively deal with the incident reported 
regardless of being a small or large failure. They provide 
the clinicians involved in the incident with feedback and 
deduce the lessons from the pool of available incident 
information/knowledge through analysis.
However, in the case of hospital B, while incidents are 
often identified and reported, clinicians perceived that 
little effort is made from the management side to deduce 
lessons from some potentially important streams of inci-
dents reports. Clinicians in hospital B overwhelmingly 
said that when they report the incident most of the time 
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there is no feedback afterwards unless for a highly visible 
crisis.
The trouble I have with the system is they [manage-
ment team] never give feedback. So, if you send it off, 
it seems to go somewhere, but you have no idea what 
happens next. That’s very annoying because you’re 
putting it in because you think something is wrong—
you want at least feedback (Dietician 37, Hospital B).
So, that’s almost us making the people above us 
aware that this thing [incident] happened. But then 
I think the worst thing is when you send the form, 
you don’t know what happens to that. We don’t get to 
find out what the consequences were because of that. 
For example, patients are transferred from another 
ward when they are sick, you know, they should have 
to tell us [their details]. If we fill out the [incident] 
form, does that ward find out that we filled the form 
out? Do they know that what they did was wrong? I 
don’t think so, because I know the wards here. I don’t 
think I’ve ever heard if anybody said that there was 
a report about us as a ward or anything (Nurse 29, 
Hospital B).
We fill out forms, but that’s really annoying because 
we don’t know what’s happening with the form we 
filled out. I think it would be quite nice to know what 
the outcome was. And I want to know something has 
been done (Doctor 31, Hospital B).
The major issue raised here is around the need for 
visible management support. While managers in hospital 
A highly support the learning process by adequately 
analysing the reported incidents, whether small or large 
and providing feedback to clinicians making reports, 
managers in hospital B do not normally support the 
process as such and largely ignore the small incidents. 
This means that at hospital B, most of the time, the 
learning process is stopped at this stage due to the lack of 
management support.
Incorporating changes into practice
Once sound solutions have been derived, the manage-
ment team should put the lessons into practice so that to 
ensure that the essence of the learning points is captured 
by all relevant actors.17 Then, all the actors should inte-
grate the useful part of the knowledge into their knowl-
edge and apply it into their day- to- day job. Following this, 
the management team need to make sure that organi-
sational behaviour is, in fact, changed as a result of the 
lessons deduced from incidents reports. This requires 
continuous monitoring to make sure that new action 
plans are implemented and followed by clinicians. This is 
important because there might be barriers in place in the 
use of new procedures that need to be solved and recti-
fied; otherwise, the true active learning process will fail.
This study found that the identified lessons in both 
hospitals are shared with frontline clinicians through 
passive communications. Managers hand decisions down 
through the chain of instructions/procedures and largely 
neglect supporting the frontline clinicians in the use of 
new knowledge. This means that, when any new proce-
dures are put into practice, the management team usually 
do not ensure whether or not they are being used effec-
tively by clinicians. As documented elsewhere,5 clinicians 
are less likely to be able to use the knowledge and learn 
effectively through passive interactions.
There are sometimes when we report things, but they 
didn’t get acted on, how we like. We see the same 
problems happen over and over again. But if you re-
port something, you would not want to see it again 
(Nurse 18, Hospital A).
I know once the patient was affected due to NG. The 
procedure changed about how you have to monitor, 
how far the tube was in, you have to measure the tube 
every time before you feed, make sure that the tube 
is in the right place and things like that. So, anoth-
er procedure changed for that, for instance, putting 
there, it was sort of like read it and sign it. So, no-
body said to me have you read that and sign that no-
body checks to see if I’ve read and signed (Nurse 32, 
Hospital B).
The interview data, however, appeared to indicate that 
the major incidents are discussed in staff meetings and 
managers try to highlight the key points. Additionally, 
when necessary, the management team, due to patient 
safety, see a benefit in helping resolve the issue.
We do have staff meetings and if there is something 
very serious or have a major risk associated with it or a 
patient death or something, the management would 
feedback to the staff (Doctor 1, Hospital A).
However, it is argued that if organisations focus on a 
problem for a short period of time and forget about it 
when key stakeholders move on or new priorities emerge, 
effective learning does not take place.17 Evidence from 
both hospitals suggested this is peer support that plays 
a more significant role in continuous monitoring of 
improvements and changes in practice.
We’ve had an incident where the patient fainted be-
cause the feeding tube was in the wrong place. So, 
now the procedure is so strict. So, that’s such a serious 
incident. That’s why I think it was feedback formally 
and also informally through ward members of staff 
being like “oh my god do you know this happened”. 
And then now everybody knows about the incident. 
But this is more the nurses that helped each other to 
do the right thing. For instance, if somebody is not 
doing it correctly, one of the nurses says “you need 
to do this, it’s important because we had an incident 
where a patient fainted” (Nurse 24, Hospital B).
A patient came to the hospital with 5 different medi-
cations but their GP [General Practitioner] had pre-
scribed 10 different ones. We kept giving them the 
5 that they brought and missing 5 other tablets and 
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the patient died because of that. Now when new pa-
tients are admitted, the first thing that our pharma-
cists say to you [nurses] is about their medications 
and emphasize their importance because a patient 
died. Pharmacists have a system that they can log 
onto to check what GPs prescribed. But there is noth-
ing on the system to say patients have died because of 
this. It’s just passed on through their [pharmacists] 
knowledge and their understanding of it (Nurse 11, 
Hospital A).
As these quotes demonstrate, the success of organi-
sational learning and service improvement also lies in 
informal learning in the workplace. Some of the clini-
cians, however, were particularly concerned that some-
times peers understand the procedures differently and 
therefore provide feedback in different versions. Also, 
some of the clinicians remained sceptical about whether 
they can provide feedback to their peers.
One person says “oh I was told you must do like this” 
and then some else says “I was told you must do that”. 
And then you worried oh one person wants me to do 
that and then another, you know. I feel like not every-
body read from the same book (Nurse 22, Hospital 
B).
It is dangerous because I could know something then 
that’s like it’s not really my place then to tell other 
people because I’m not the ward manager. But be-
cause I’ve chosen to go out there and ask the ques-
tions and get the answers should it be then down to 
me to feed that back (Nurse 18, Hospital A).
Overall, the analysis demonstrates, on the one hand, 
peer support and informal learning can help to promote 
organisational learning and service improvement, but 
it also reinforces the role of managers to check clini-
cians’ understanding of the new procedures and play a 
more active role in the monitoring of improvements and 
changes in practice. The findings suggest that managers’ 
lack of proactive engagement in supporting frontline 
clinicians in the use of new procedures resulted in the 
reoccurrence of the same incidents, confirming that active 
learning did not take place in either of these hospitals.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study theorised treating organisational learning as a 
black box cannot provide a comprehensive explanation 
of the barriers to learning from past failure experiences. 
It thus argued that to understand how to make healthcare 
safer, we need a focus on a process view emphasising the 
sequence of events that provides insights on the nature 
of the inner workings of the learning process. Based on a 
sample of 40 interviews from two NHS hospitals, this study 
systematically revealed the main barriers to active organ-
isational learning. The learning process was investigated 
from the stage of pre- reporting medical errors (namely, 
the stage of initial incident identification) to the stages 
of reporting and of post- reporting incidents (namely, the 
stage of deducing appropriate lessons from failures and 
that of incorporating changes into practice).
The comparison picture of the learning process in 
hospital A (a high performing hospital) and hospital B (a 
low performing hospital) is presented in table 2. Colours 
are used in this table as signifiers to represent the robust-
ness or otherwise of each stage of the learning process 
in each of the two hospitals. In specific terms, green 
columns represent the areas with fewer issues and amber 
columns indicate the areas that need significant improve-
ment. The socio- technical interplay among soft and hard 
issues that describes the strengths and weaknesses of each 
of the stages in the two hospitals indicates that there are 
significant differences as well as similarities between the 
two hospitals. Although hospital B does not compare well 
with the learning process in hospital A, there is one thing 
in common: the ultimate goal of the learning process, 
which is preventing the reoccurrence of the same inci-
dents, is not achieved, regardless of the overall NHS clas-
sification whether as high or low performing healthcare 
organisations. The analysis uncovered that the major 
stumbling blocks to active learning are mainly rooted in 
Table 2 Comparison of learning process between hospital A and B
Stages of organisational 
learning from medical errors Hospital A Hospital B
1. Initial incident identification Patient safety highlights the importance of 
incident reporting. The majority of clinicians 
(18/20) confirmed that just culture creates an 
environment that they feel psychologically safe to 
share their mistakes.
Patient safety highlights the importance of incident 
reporting. However, the majority of interviewees (15/20) 
confirmed that a blaming culture can impact the accuracy 
of the incident reports as clinicians do not always feel 
psychologically safe to reveal the true causes of the 
failure.
2. Reporting incidents Unified mechanism and purpose- designed systems of incident information gathering facilitate incident 
reporting and identifying lessons.
3. Deducing appropriate 
lessons from incidents reports
Managers highly support the learning process by 
properly analysing both small and large incidents 
and providing feedback to clinicians.
Managers only support large failures and hugely ignore 
small incidents and do not actively provide feedback to 
clinicians.
4. Incorporating changes into 
practice
Passive communication and lack of managers’ proactive support and engagement in integrating changes into 
practice.
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the post- reporting stage (ie, incorporating changes into 
practice) and ultimately managers wishing to make the 
learning process a success need to pay more attention to 
social issues.
The findings of this study point out to the fact that 
clinicians from all professional groups acknowledge the 
importance of reporting medical errors including near 
misses in increasing patient safety, and therefore, are 
willing to report their mistakes with an aim to contribute 
to organisational learning and patient safety. This 
supporting attitude seems to have been developed more 
recently as the previous studies indicated that medical 
errors are normalised within the medical context to the 
extent that clinicians,7 21 especially doctors, perceive inci-
dent reporting as unnecessary. This is a positive change 
as the learning process cannot trigger in the absence of 
clinicians’ willingness to report their mistakes. In recent 
years, there has been more emphasis on patient safety 
and alignment of incident reporting to better care for 
patients which, in turn, improved a more favourable atti-
tude to the importance of reporting incidents.
Although the online incident reporting system in both 
hospitals has some limitations (eg, recurrent lack of access 
to a computer, lack of opportunity to add more informa-
tion by clinicians after submitting the online form), its 
benefits outweigh its limitations. The findings indicated 
that the newly introduced online IS makes information 
sharing between the clinicians and the management team 
more effective and efficient. The findings also confirmed 
that clinicians found the use of standardised forms useful 
in documenting the incidents. This argument is in contrast 
with the conclusion drawn by Currie et al7 who stated that 
the purpose of the standardised forms and the informa-
tion that they intended to collate are not well understood 
by the clinicians. The newly introduced electronic system 
may explain this contrast. The findings of this study, 
however, are in line with previous findings of7 in that the 
managers do not always trust the accuracy of the reports. 
Nonetheless, this issue is rooted in the hospitals’ culture. 
Reflecting on Hignett et al’s3 analysis of NHS culture, the 
just culture and clinicians’ fear of being blamed because 
of their mistakes remain an issue in some NHS hospitals. 
The findings of this study show that, unlike hospital A, 
just culture is not yet well established in hospital B and 
this negatively affects the learning process from the very 
first stage (ie, initial incident identification) as clinicians 
do not always feel psychologically safe to reveal the true 
causes of the failure. The findings further indicated that 
when the local managers are perceived as trustworthy, the 
chance of reporting/documenting more accurate reports 
will increase, hence the importance of the role played by 
local managers in the organisational learning process and 
patient safety.
The challenge, however, is that the local managers do 
not always support the learning process which consti-
tutes a barrier to the active organisational learning from 
failure experiences. In hospital B, the lack of manage-
ment support is more visible and, therefore, the learning 
process is normally interrupted in hospital B earlier 
than in hospital A. While clinicians report their mistakes 
intending to receive feedback from the management team, 
the local managers in hospital B normally do not provide 
feedback unless for a highly visible crisis. However, ‘every 
failure is a learning opportunity’ and, therefore, learning 
from small failures or near misses can be as important as 
learning from large failures in preventing future occur-
rence of errors .41 This lack of management support leads 
to missing the opportunity to learn from small failure 
cases as well as sending the wrong signal to frontline clini-
cians that reporting medical errors is not essential.49 In 
hospital A, however, managers support the organisational 
learning process more actively by providing feedback to 
the clinicians and making better use of the potential of 
the pool of information to identify the lessons from both 
small and large failures. Such support in hospital A helps 
the lessons at least being more actively learnt in their 
immediate environment by those reporting the incident.
Despite this, the main issue that both hospitals share 
come from incorporating the lessons into practice and 
spreading the lessons learnt beyond their immediate 
environment. The management team do not actively 
collaborate with clinicians to incorporate knowledge 
into practice, but knowledge is shared through passive 
communications. The finding reflects Sujan’s49 perspec-
tive that informal learning through peer support and 
informal discussions on the wards can help in imple-
menting changes after incidents. However, as with 
Adler’s50 findings, frontline clinicians lack the required 
incentives to use the new instructions and procedures 
effectively. Equally, frontline clinicians may think they 
do not have the power/authority to monitor changes in 
practice by providing feedback to their peers. Thus, more 
support from managers is needed to monitor and ensure 
that new action plans are implemented and followed by 
clinicians. However, managers’ lack of proactive support 
and engagement in incorporating changes into practice 
resulted in dispersion and disconnection between the 
ideal standard and practice.5 In effect, the same mistakes 
repeatedly happen confirming that active learning does 
not take place and the attempt to alert the organisational 
behaviour is hampered by the lack of local managers’ 
support.
The present study contributes to the field of safety 
management system by detecting which factors are 
encouraging/impeding the learning process in what 
stage and why from clinicians’ perspective. In effect, the 
study argues that to enhance organisational learning and 
make healthcare safer, it is crucial to pay more consid-
erable attention to local leadership and post- reporting 
stages. Although the NHS policies remain the same for all 
NHS hospitals, significant differences (eg, just culture vs 
blaming culture; extracting lessons from both small and 
large failures vs ignoring small failures) were observed in 
the learning process of the two NHS hospitals investigated 
in this study where these differences can be traced back 
to the local mangers attitude and behaviour. Additionally, 
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and interestingly, the main reason for the ineffective 
organisational learning (namely, the reoccurrence of 
the same mistakes) in both hospitals is also rooted in the 
lack of proactive engagement of the local managers in 
incorporating changes into practice. This is where the 
learning process often seems to fracture and therefore 
the mistakes reoccur. It makes sense to suggest then a 
focus on promoting a collaborative culture among local 
managers is crucial given that for organisational learning 
to be effective, local managers need to work collabora-
tively with frontline clinicians to reduce the gap between 
the recommended procedures and practice and improve 
the patient safety. Such collaboration will encourage 
double- loop learning51 where local managers and front-
line clinicians can work together to identify the problems, 
correct them and, more importantly, ensure whether the 
new procedures are performed and are effective.
In conclusion, the formal incident reporting system may 
seem ineffective49; however, it is essential in improving 
patient safety. A formal incident reporting system facil-
itates communicating explicit knowledge from people 
in higher ranks and spreading the critical lessons from 
their immediate environment. Nevertheless, the success 
of this system primarily lies in the local managers’ support 
and collaboration with frontline clinicians. Promoting 
informal learning and giving more power to clinicians to 
monitor changes on the wards can complete the formal 
organisational learning process. However, managers 
will need to encourage frontline clinicians to use the 
new procedures correctly and effectively and address 
any knowledge gap and misunderstanding of the front-
line clinicians in the use of new procedures. Institu-
tionalising social interaction and cooperation between 
managers and frontline clinicians contribute to change 
implementation52 and alerting organisational behaviour. 
These findings could also have important implications 
for private hospitals, especially given studies show that 
private hospitals are not more accountable, efficient and 
medically effective than public hospitals.53
Being retrospective, our study has a certain number of 
research limitations. First, the results of this study indicate 
that there are differences in the organisational learning 
process in a high and low performing hospital where 
these differences are mostly rooted in a trusted working 
climate and personal commitment. However, more quan-
titative analysis is needed to examine whether there 
is a connection between the quality of organisational 
learning and the hospital’s overall performance. Second, 
the aim of this study was to investigate how the organisa-
tional learning process can be improved from frontline 
clinicians’ perspective. Thus, the recommendations of 
this study for promoting the learning process in general 
and for local managers in particular are only informed 
by the beliefs and perceptions of the clinicians. However, 
given the active role of local managers in the learning 
process and organisational change, more research is 
needed to bring more insights from the perspective of 
local managers. Thirdly, the scope of this research is 
limited to western healthcare organisations (ie, NHS in 
England) where safety measures have been applied. A 
future research agenda needs to engage in more empir-
ical and conceptual clarifications of some of the issues 
raised here in low- income and middle- income countries 
where safety measures have not yet been adapted for 
successful application.54
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